Walking the Tight Rope in Petroleum Products Pricing
V Shunmugam
An investor with an uncanny knack for anticipating policy effects on the markets would have balanced his portfolio with the gravity-defying performance of the so-called ‘public sector blue chips’ into crude refining, including HPCL (35.1 %), BPCL (39.2 %), etc., July 11 till Feb-end. Of course, being an explorer of oil and gas ONGC was an exception to the gravity-defying price trend. Thank god, that they were not fully disinvested, which would have otherwise led to the whole of the profits of this price differential between derivatives and crude accumulating into a few private hands. This would make one wonder if our current policy only serves its main objective of protecting the vulnerable sections of the society from market volatility. Given that our administered prices have become stickier of late, it did protect the vulnerable population when the markets were upwardly volatile but have not when the markets were south-bound since July, 2009.
Why did the stickiness get built into a mechanism which was supposed to be flexible? It was expected to be less glutinous as the then government decided to mark the prices of crude derivatives to markets on a 15-day interval during 2002 in an effort to make way for gradual dismantling of administered price mechanism when the crude markets were calm at their bottom. Unfortunately, the spirit behind this pioneering move was lost in few months as was evident in the slowness with which derivative prices were marked to the market movements. The mark-to-market (MTM) policy ran out of steam as crude began its unstinted northward journey. The volatility also remained high due to heightened geopolitical concerns/rigid supplies and the MTM needed more time for political and financial homework to be done than the policy would desire. This was well reflected in the retarded policy response that often matched the policy comfort level than the commercial comfort levels of the PSU and even the private sector (Reliance) refiner who took up aggressive domestic marketing. The complete reversal of the 2002 policy made the then private sector efforts into expanding retail network to be dispersed into thin air. Fortunately, the escalating real estate prices would have helped them make good of their losses.
With the crude prices at the bottom of the market (though volatile) compared with the all-time high of July 11 at $147/barrel, is it the right time for us to think of deregulating petroleum derivative prices? Deregulating is easier said than done in a plural democracy with large inequality like ours unless the common man who is being taken out of the umbrella of administered pricing mechanism (APM) understands and is enabled to assimilate market volatility. With crude being much pervasive in human life today, a sudden removal of the APM without a plan to take care of the economically vulnerable sections of the industry and individuals would have the potential to widen the inequality that already exists in the economy.
How can policy makers prevent APM from benefiting a few individuals or institutions (public or otherwise) due to the political stickiness of prices? Of course, the government is a major beneficiary of the refining and derivative marketing profits, holding a stake of about 50 percent or more in the public sector refineries. However, what would be worrisome for public policy making is to find ways that would prevent inordinate cash benefits from getting accumulated in to the hands of a few individuals and institutions arising out of its own operation.
Assuming that the current stickiness in prices is likely to exist for the time being, with the elections around the corner it would least incentivize any government in power to react radically by dismantling APM though crude is at its low (yet unstable). Against this backdrop, if the crude and derivative prices were to remain at the same level since the last revision on January 28, 2009, it will continue to contribute towards the widening of economic inequality in a small way. Such an inequality would get multiplied at times of financial boom. Hence, it is necessary that profits arising out of a public policy be tapped for public purposes rather than letting it slip into private pockets.
The tools that are available with our policymakers include making the derivative prices less sticky so that the profits from public policy making do not fall into private hands but yet making these PSU industries attractive to the investors. Having taken a plunge in to liberalization, disinvestment will remain a priority and may set the tone for APM dismantling.
The other avenue would be to increase taxes on crude or derivatives without affecting petroleum product prices. However, estimates in the recent past revealed that petrol and diesel were being taxed to the extent of 56 and 38 percent respectively. Is it worth an option to look at? Those who ask such question should look at countries such as the UK, Germany, and France that have taxes on petroleum products much higher than ours. At times of high fiscal deficit and policy constrained high prices it will be worthwhile considering a flexi tax option.
History reveals that given crude oil as an energy source is widely used for transportation purposes, nations with high dependence on indirect taxes considered taxing crude heavily to capture a part of the advantage that the petroleum products provides it users to help spread it among non-privileged. But our government has a strong dual purpose of increasing the taxes if it at all decides to do so without changing the administered prices. One to continue supporting subsidization of poor man’s fuel — kerosene, and to accumulate funds in ‘oil pool’ to buy back the oil bonds whenever they mature. Secondly, such tax revenue without affecting petroleum prices become all the more prominent at this time of financial crisis is to keep the fiscal kitty healthy. No wonder, a recent media report quoted finance ministry sources as looking at increasing customs on crude when its prices were on an upward spiral!